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India and international organisations: Continuing the pursuit of
Great Power status
David Scott assesses India’s interactions with various regional and global organisations and
considers which Modi will prioritise as he continues the drive for Great Power status. 
This post forms part of a new series on the India At LSE blog, India’s Foreign Relations Under
Modi. Click here to see more posts.
Under Modi, India’s attitude and role in international organisations will most likely continue to
reflect a drive for Great Power status, an ingrained stress on “strategic autonomy”, and mixed
regional competition and global cooperation with China.
With regard to India’s immediate neighbourhood, the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation  (SAARC)
has to date proved of limited success, and Modi will need to decide how much energy to put into galvanising the
organisation. His invitation to other SAARC leaders to attend his inauguration in May 2014 suggested he might
be so inclined. However, China’s push for SAARC entry is something that India is likely to be reluctant over.
India’s efforts may instead go into galvanising BIMSTEC as a useful bridgehead to Southeast Asia, given that
BIMSTEC membership is the same as SAARC minus a problematic Pakistan but plus Myanmar.
Modi might look to India’s maritime neighbourhood and put more energy into revitalising the Indian Ocean Rim
Association. However, its economic potential remains largely unrealised. Consequently, Modi may find the Indian
Ocean Naval Symposium a more practical Look South focus, especially as China is not a member. Such
maritime levers for presence and influence may also be reflected in Modi active pushing the IBSA mechanism
with South Africa and Brazil; a self-avowedly South-South democratic grouping which does not involve China,
and which has already initiated trilateral naval exercises since 2008.
Within India’s extended neighbourhood, the already strong Look East economic links with the Association of
Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) look set to have the January 2010 free trade agreement in “goods”
complemented by agreement in “services and investments” at the India-ASEAN summit in December 2014.
Greater India-ASEAN security cooperation, especially on the maritime front, beckons for Modi. India’s decision to
join in the RIMPAC exercises off Hawaii in summer 2014 may also be the signal for India to push from observer
to membership status of the West Pacific Naval Symposium. Meanwhile, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the
East Asia Summit bring Indian involvement in East Asia, but in a subdued fashion. There, it remains to be seen
how far Modi will make India’s voice heard, and what his message there over China will be.
It also remains to be seen how far Modi will push for membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) organisation. There are already indications that India’s long-standing request for
membership is moving forward with the invitation from the host, China, for India to attend the APEC summit in
November 2014. Another decision for Modi is whether to maintain India’s initial interest in setting up the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership that does not include the United States but does have China, or whether
to change direction and seek membership of a Trans-Pacific Partnership that has the US as a member but does
not have China. One clear development is India’s admittance in 2015 as a full member to the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, which will strengthen India’s Look North outreach to an energy-rich Central Asia, amid
some unofficial competition with China.
Further afield are questions of India’s relations with the European Union (EU) and with the North Atlantic
Organisation (NATO). With regards to the EU, the strategic partnership formally announced in 2004 has not
been translated into much tangible action. Climate change cooperation, anti-terrorism cooperation and
conclusion of free trade negotiations remain the three most important issues facing Modi in India-EU relations.
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However India continues to see the EU as a weak political partner given the foreign policy limitations of the EU.
As to NATO, interest has been somewhat limited because India’s significant security relations with the US and
France operate at a bilateral level. A way forward to strengthen India-NATO institutional links would be to
upgrade the existing Track-2 (unofficial) dialogue process with Track-1.5 (unofficial-official) or Track-1 (official)
formats. A formal Partnership Agreement  between India and NATO is a possibility; echoing such arrangements
already in existence between NATO and other designated “global partners” like Pakistan and Japan. On the one
hand, the EU and (post-Afghanistan) NATO focus on Europe and the Mediterranean is of little geopolitical
significance to India. On the other hand, in the Gulf of Aden, the EU’s Operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operation
Ocean Shield parallel India’s own naval deployments, and could be the focus for their closer security cooperation
with India.
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Various non-Western forums for India are the RIC (Russia, India, China), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
South Africa) and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) formations. RIC presents a political trilateral, BRICS
focuses on economics, and BASIC focuses on environmental matters. One significance in these three
formations for India is that they all involve China alongside India and in different ways represent implicit critiques
to Western political leadership of the international system. This was perhaps indicated in the decision in
September 2014 by BRICS to set up a New Development Bank (NDB), based in Shanghai with an Indian as its
President. India may continue to push for greater influence through greater contributions and voting rights in
global mechanisms like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but the NDB may serve as a more
attractive venue for India?
Politically, the biggest organisational issue for India remains its long established long established desire for a
Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council. Previously obstructed by Beijing, this will be an issue for Modi to
pursue with China. Such an issue returns us to India’s drive for recognition as a Great Power.
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